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European Central Bank working paper series 17Abstract: We study optimal pricing rules for a public large-value payment system (LVPS) that produces
a public good (like prevention of systemic risk) but faces competition by a private LVPS for the private
provision of large value payments. We show that the marginal cost of the public LVPS has to be corrected
by a ￿public good factor￿that can be interpreted alternatively as the decrease in the cost of providing the
public good when the private activity of the public system increases, or as the subsidy needed for private
banks to internalize the cost of systemic risk. In either interpretation, the public good factor is easy to
measure: it corresponds to the subsidy needed for private banks to allocate their payments in the way that
is desired by banking authorities.
Keywords: large-value payment systems, public goods, pricing rules.
JEL codes: G28, H41.
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This paper proposes a pricing scheme for publicly run Large Value Payment Systems 
that takes into account a possible “public good factor”.  
 
Most interbank payments of a certain size are transferred via so-called Large Value 
Payment Systems (LVPS). In most countries, LVPS are organized and operated 
publicly, often by the central bank. In others, these systems are privately organized 
entities, which are usually regulated to some extent. In many countries, both private 
and public payment systems compete for customers. 
 
Public involvement in large value payment systems has many reasons. Historically, 
central banks had a unique role in the provision of payment services. Also, a central 
bank has a strong interest in the smooth and efficient functioning of the payments 
system because it is used for monetary policy operations, and because it is the 
backbone of any financial system and a possible channel through which a financial 
crisis could spread. It is often argued that from a welfare perspective, central banks 
are better able to run a payment system than private providers. Reasons include a 
central banks’ greater concern for systemic risk, scope economies between different 
central banking functions, or the ability to react quicker in crisis times when the 
central bank is involved in the operation of the payment system. 
 
Accordingly, the provision of payment services by a central bank is often linked to 
other central-bank-specific services it provides, be it monetary policy operations, 
oversight over the payment system, or possible emergency liquidity assistance. This 
makes it extremely difficult to allocate costs to the different functions. If costs cannot 
be separated according to their functions but are instead allocated to the operation of 
the payments system, the latter may not be able to operate competitively. As a 
consequence, cost recovery, as required in the statutes of some central banks, for 
instance the European Central Bank, is difficult to achieve. A departure from the cost 
recovery principle may therefore be justified in order to guarantee the provision of the 
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normal payment services. It asks how to incorporate this public good activity into the 
pricing of the large value payment services. It is assumed that there are economies of 
scope between the provision of payment services (which is a private good that can 
also be supplied by the private sector) and other, central bank specific services. In 
other words, the public good can be supplied more cheaply when the volume of 
payments processed through the public large value payment system is large. We are 
interested in determining the welfare-maximizing price schedule. 
 
We find that a subsidy to the public system is a way to guarantee a sufficient 
provision of the public good services. The economic intuition is that without this 
subsidy, that is with marginal cost pricing, prices would not reflect the impact on the 
system’s settlement activity an the cost of providing the public good: a reduction of 
these costs requires a high level of output which can only be achieved by a reduction 
in prices that are charged to customers. 
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A new generation of TARGET, the European-wide system of public payment systems, is currently
being designed. In TARGET2, a single price structure will apply to all national components. Prices
will be such that the benchmark system, i.e. the most cost-e¢ cient system, is able to recover costs,
taking into account a so-called ￿public good factor￿ . There are several possible justi￿cations for
such a public good factor. For example, a public good provided by TARGET could be related to the
reduction in systemic risk that arises from the central bank involvement in the settlement process
(or from having a central bank as operator of the system). Indeed, ￿nancial stability shows aspects
of a public good, since it bene￿ts everyone (and therefore ful￿lls the criterion of non-exclusivity),
and banks can try to free-ride on others￿willingness to pay for it. Examples for central bank
involvement in the reduction of systemic risk could be the provision of backup facilities by the
central bank, or its better ability to provide emergency liquidity assistance in times of crises. Also,
the fact that the public system o⁄ers end-of-day settlement in central bank money can reduce
systemic risk.
The objective of this article is to design a pricing framework for a public payment system which
takes into account the existence of such a ￿public good￿ , provided by this system. The article is to
give a welfare theoretic foundation for pricing rules that are imposed in practice to public networks
that are in competition with private ￿rms. To this aim, we assume that standard payment services
are o⁄ered both by a public and a private system. Additionally, the public system provides some
type of public good. Due to the public good provision, the unit cost of processing payments is lower
in the private system while the ￿xed cost component of the public good system can be allocated to
both the private and the public good activities.
We ￿nd that the presence of the public good activity implies that prices should be set below
marginal costs of providing settlement activities. The economic intuition is that without this
subsidy, i.e. with marginal cost pricing, prices do not re￿ ect the impact of TARGET￿ s settlement
activity on the cost of providing the public good. A reduction of these costs requires a high level
of output and thus a reduction in prices that are charged to customers.
While the model is derived having in mind a public payment system, analogies to other sectors
can be drawn. An example would be public hospitals: these provide the same services as private
hospitals, but at the same time they may have a speci￿c (costly) task of training young surgeons.
Thus public hospitals typically have higher costs than private clinics but reducing their activity
7
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public hospitals. Another example is the universal service obligation in telecommunications and
post o¢ ce (see ChonØ et al. 2001).
2 A Simple Model of Large Value Payment Systems
There are two payment systems. System 1 is a public one (such as TARGET), and System 2 is
a private system (for instance, Euro1). The private system is unregulated. Both systems provide
interbank payments, a private good. Additionally, System 1 provides a public good. We take this
market structure as given and do not discuss the possibility of auctioning o⁄ the right to provide
the public good.3 For simplicity, we take the level of public good activity as given but assume that
its cost can vary.
Denoting q1 TARGET￿ s output of the private good, its costs of production are
C1 = F(q1) + c1(￿;e1)q1:
The ￿rst term F denotes the ￿xed cost of producing the public good. We assume that it is a
decreasing function of the activity on the private good. This assumption is meant to capture the
fact that backup facilities or end of day settlement are less costly to provide if Target is also used
to process ￿ordinary￿interbank payments. The assumption F0 < 0 can be interpreted as having
economies of scope between the public and the private good.
The second term relates to the production of the private good: c1 is the marginal cost of
producing the private good, which depends on two parameters: ￿ is an e¢ ciency parameter, e1 is





. Here, ￿ refers to the most e¢ cient, and ￿ to the least e¢ cient possible type.
The distribution is common knowledge. System 1￿ s disutility of e⁄ort is C(e1):
For simplicity we assume
c1(￿;e1) = ￿ ￿ e1
In the present set-up, it is assumed that the cost of production of the private good are linear. One
could easily introduce economies of scale in its production by adding a ￿xed cost term. However,
3This possibility is discussed in the literature on universal services obligations, for examples in
the postal sector (see e.g. ChonØ et al. (2001) and the references therein).
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abstract from it.
The costs of production for the private system are
C2 = c2q2
where q2 denotes System 2￿ s output of the private good.4
Banks are uniformly distributed on the unit interval, with System 1 being located at 0 and
System 2 located at 1. Therefore, we assume that banks are heterogenous in their preferences
about which payment system to use. For example, some may want more security for their payments
and thus have an intrinsic preference for the public system. We assume that if the two systems
have the same costs, it is e¢ cient that they share equally the market, i.e. q1 = q2 = 1
2. The unit
transportation cost is t. Thus t measures the intensity of banks￿tastes di⁄erentiation and thus
determines the cross elasticity of demand. Each bank has an inelastic demand for one unit of the
private good, but chooses to purchase it either from the public or from the private system.
Each system maximizes pro￿ts.5 There is a regulator who wants to maximize overall social
welfare. The regulator does not observe the e¢ ciency parameter ￿, but it does observe costs.
The timing of the game is the following. At stage 1, System 1 learns ￿. At stage 2, the regulator
o⁄ers to the public system a contract that speci￿es a price or quantity in the private market and
a transfer as long as the system￿ s costs satisfy a certain objective. We will invoke the revelation
principle where the system stating type b ￿ gets contract fp1(b ￿);T(b ￿)g, where T(b ￿) is the transfer
to System 1 if it meets its cost objective. If the system sends no message, it gets a pro￿t of 0. After





We assume that the private system is competitive, so it acts as a price-taker and chooses p2 = c2.
There is a cost of public funds, denoted ￿ > 0.
We ￿nd the equilibrium by solving backward. The demand functions for the private good (as
4We could also decompose the cost of the private system by introducing an e¢ ciency parameter
￿2 and a cost reducing e⁄ort e2. This would complicate our analysis but would not alter the
qualitative results.
5The ￿pro￿t￿of the public system can be interpreted as a rent that is dissipated through higher
salaries or better conditions of work for the personnel. This rent is necessary to provide incentives
to the public system for attaining its objectives.
6An equivalent formulation is that the transfer to TARGET is a function of its realized unit cost
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c2 ￿ p1(b ￿)
2t
(1)
for the public system, and




c2 ￿ p1(b ￿)
2t
; (2)
for the private system.
Notice that the demand for payments in each system is exactly 1
2 when either the public system
chooses the same prices as the private one (p1(b ￿) = p2 = c2) or when the transportation costs be-
come in￿nitely high (t ! 1), which corresponds to a complete absence of substitutability between
the two systems.
The pro￿t of TARGET is
￿1(￿;b ￿) =
h
p1(b ￿) ￿ c1(￿;e(￿;b ￿))
i￿
t + c2 ￿ p
4t
￿







3 First Best Allocation (perfect information benchmark)
We ￿rst derive the optimal solution for the benchmark of a regulator that has perfect information,
i.e. can observe ￿. The regulator can control the e⁄ort of ￿rm 1 and outputs of both ￿rms.
Given that the total payment volume and the level of the public good activity are ￿xed, the
objective is to minimize total costs. There are three types of costs: transportation cost, cost of





1 + (1 ￿ q1)2￿
The total cost of production of all goods (including the disutility of cost reduction e⁄orts) is
(￿ ￿ e1)q1 + c2(1 ￿ q1) + C(e1) + F(q1);
and the cost of transfers to the public system is
￿[(￿ ￿ e1)q1 + F(q1) + C(e1) ￿ p1q1]






1 + (1 ￿ q1)2￿
+ c2(1 ￿ q1) + (1 + ￿)[c1q1 + F(q1) + C(￿ ￿ c1)] ￿ ￿p1q1: (4)
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well as the optimal level of e⁄ort. The ￿rst order conditions are
@SC
@e1
= q1 ￿ C0(e￿








￿ ￿(p1q1)0 = 0: (6)
The ￿rst of these equations gives the e¢ cient level of e⁄ort e￿
1. With a convex disutility of e⁄ort,
we have that e￿
1 is an increasing function of q1, the level of activity of TARGET. Furthermore, since
we have assumed that ￿rm 2 is a competitive ￿rm setting p2 = c2, from the second equation it
follows that





Note that from the demand function (1), the left-hand side of the equation is equal to p1. Further-




q1 the elasticity of demand for TARGET, we ￿nd










This formula has a standard interpretation: if ￿ = 0 (no cost of public funds) and F0 = 0
(no economy of scope between public and private good) then the optimal price for TARGET is
marginal cost c1. As long as there are ￿xed costs related to either the public or the private good
provision, this would lead to a de￿cit, so transfers from the taxpayer to the public system would
be required.
If there are economies of scope (so that F0 < 0) but no cost of public funds (￿ = 0) it is optimal
to charge a generalized marginal cost c1+F0(q1), which is lower than c1. The resulting price would
take into account that the public system bears a cost for the provision of the public good. The
economic interpretation is that TARGET should be subsidized so that its output is higher, because
this decreases the cost of providing the public good.
Finally, if ￿ 6= 0, i.e. the provision of public funds is costly, there is an additional term a la
Ramsey, which is inversely proportional to the elasticity of demand. In other words, the more
elastic the demand for payments in the public system, the lower should be its price. Thus in this
model, the unit price charged by TARGET, p1 should correspond to its marginal cost c1, minus a
subsidy equal to the di⁄erence between the economies of scope factor jF0(q1)j and a factor ￿
(1+￿)"1p1
that increases with the cost ￿ of public funds.
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We now turn to the more interesting case in which there is private information on the e¢ ciency




with distribution G(￿). Again, there is a
planner who would like to minimize total costs, but he does so without knowledge of the e¢ ciency
parameter. In order to provide incentives to reduce the costs of TARGET, the planner has to give
a rent ￿ to the employees of TARGET.
The contract given to the providers of the public system is now a function of the signal b ￿, and
therefore, the system￿ s pro￿t depends both on ￿ and b ￿. Truth-telling7 by the system requires that
choosing b ￿ = ￿ maximizes its pro￿t. Assuming truth-telling, the pro￿t of TARGET can therefore
be stated as a function of the true type ￿ as
￿(￿) = Max
h
T(b ￿) + (p1(b ￿) ￿ c1(b ￿))q1(b ￿) ￿ F(q1(b ￿)) ￿ C(￿ ￿ c1(b ￿))
i
: (8)
Here, we have used





C(e1(b ￿)) and ￿(￿) = 0
The ￿rst equation is a consequence of the incentive compatibility condition (8), and is derived
by using the envelope condition. The second condition states that no rent should be given to the
















7By the revelation principle (Myerson, 1979) this is without loss of generality.
8These conditions are fairly standard in the literature on mechanism design. For more details
see, for instance, La⁄ont and Tirole (1993).
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1 + (1 ￿ q2
1)
￿






Compared to the ￿rst-best case, there is now an additional term: this term re￿ ects the cost
associated with the presence of asymmetric information. From the ￿rst order conditions, again
taken with respect to q1 and e1, we obtain


















Let us start by analyzing (10). Recall that in the ￿rst-best case, the optimal level of e⁄ort
satis￿ed C0(e1) = q1. Therefore, the presence of asymmetric information implies that e⁄ort is lower
and therefore that production costs are higher in the public system. The reason is that in order
to induce a higher level of e⁄ort, the planner needs to give rents to TARGET. However, because
of asymmetric information, he cannot observe whether a low production cost is the result of high
e⁄ort or of a high level of e¢ ciency. The regulator faces a trade-o⁄ between achieving a high level
of e⁄ort and giving a high pro￿t to the system, which is costly because there is a cost of providing
public funds.
However, in the following we are going to prove that the pricing decision is una⁄ected by
asymmetric information. Indeed, if ￿rm 2 (EURO1) is competitive then
p1 = c2 ￿ t(2q1 ￿ 1)
and using condition (9) above, we obtain again






Thus, while private information a⁄ects the e⁄ort undertaken by the public system, it leaves the
optimal pricing rule una⁄ected. The reason for this is the fact that the private information concerns
only the level of e¢ ciency, which is a substitute to the level of e⁄ort. However, the total costs of
producing q1 are observable, and this is the reason why output and pricing (for a given level of c1)
are una⁄ected by the presence of private information.
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We have derived a pricing framework for a public payment system that is in competition with a
private system. We have assumed that, additionally, the public system provides a public good,
whose cost of production F is a function of its supply q1 of the private good. More speci￿cally, we
have assumed the presence of economies of scope: F is a decreasing function of q1.
Our ￿ndings can be summarized as follows: In the absence of a public good, and in the absence
of any ￿xed cost, the optimal pricing rule for TARGET would be to set the price equal to the
marginal cost. This would imply a balanced budget for TARGET.
However, if there is a public good with a ￿xed cost F, but there are no economies of scope
between the public and the private good (so that F0 = 0), then the optimal pricing rule is similar to
Ramsey pricing: it would be optimal to surcharge the marginal cost of a factor inversely proportional
to demand elasticity. As a result, the higher the elasticity of demand, the lower the optimal price
of the private good.
Instead, in the presence of scope economies (that is, when F0(q1) < 0), it is optimal to introduce
a ￿public good factor￿in the pricing of TARGET. This public good factor is precisely equal to
F0(q1), namely the reduction in the cost of producing the public good that is obtained when the
volume of payments going through TARGET increases marginally.
Although our results have been derived under a particular speci￿cation (Hotelling model with
uniform distribution, which gives linear demands) they can be easily extended to general demand
functions. Moreover, the ￿public good￿activity of the public system can be interpreted in a wider
sense. Consider for example a situation where the public system incorporates a higher degree
of protection against systemic risk than the private system. This may be because private banks
do not internalize the cost of systemic crises, whereas the central bank does. This implies that
the public system is more costly to operate, and that private banks tend to use it less often
than social optimality would require. Our model can be reinterpreted to ￿t this situation: the
￿public good activity￿ is just the additional level of protection provided by the public system
and F(q1) + (c1 ￿ c2)q1 measures the cost di⁄erence between the public and the private systems,
for a level of activity q1. With this interpretation, the public good factor jF0(q1)j represents the
correction factor (here, a subsidy) needed to make private banks internalize the cost of systemic
risk. This leads us to a ￿nal remark about measurement.
If one accepts the view that the public good factor has to be interpreted as the price correction
14
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risk or other), than there is a simple way to measure it. Indeed, once banking authorities have
determined the fraction q1 of (total) large value payments that they consider appropriate for the
public system (this may be in￿ uenced by political considerations) the public good factor is just
the subsidy needed for private banks to indeed allocate their payments in the way desired by
banking authorities (i.e. q1 for the public system, q2 = 1 ￿ q1 for the private system). As we have
seen in Section 3, incentives for cost reduction e⁄orts within the public system can be provided
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